Combinatorial designs have been used to construct digital fingerprint codes. Here, a new constructive algorithm for an anticollusion fingerprint code based on group-divisible designs is presented. These codes are easy to construct and available for a large number of individuals, which is important from a business point of view. Group-divisible designs have not been used previously as a tool for fingerprint code construction.
Introduction
Digital fingerprinting is a technique for embeding a fingerprint code that uniquely identifies a recipient from host contents. Because different fingerprint codes are embedded into identical contents, the embedded contents are slightly different from each other. Using this characteristic, an averaging attack can eliminate the embedded codes. An averaging attack is an attempt to remove the embedded fingerprints by averaging several copies [1] . An averaging attack attenuates the embedded codes while maintaining the original content. The uses of an averaging-resilient fingerprint code can prevent an averaging attack. Boneh and Shaw [3] presented a code system named "Frameproof code" that prevents the false detection of innocent users by pirates. Stinson and Wei [4] proposed fingerprint code systems that satisfy the "Frameproof code" using combinatorial designs. Trappe et al. [5] suggested an anticollusion fingerprint code using balanced incomplete block designs (BIBDs).
The main issue of the anticollusion fingerprint code is a practical construction problem. We found that a new fingerprint code set derived from a group-divisible partially balanced incomplete block design (GD-PBIBD) [6] is useful from an application point of view.
Preliminaries
Following Trappe et al. [5] , we have provided the basic definitions and results below. of vectors belonging to G v is called a K-resilient AND anticollusion code (AND-ACC) when any subset of K or fewer code vectors combined element-wise under AND is distinct from the element-wise AND of any other subset of K or fewer code vectors.
First, an n-resilient AND-ACC is presented. Let C consist of all n-bit binary vectors that have only a single 0 bit. For example, when n=4, C={1110, 1101, 1011, 0111}. It is easy to see that any element-wise logical AND of k ≤ n of these vectors is unique. This code has a cardinality of n and, hence, can produce at most n differently fingerprinted media. This code is referred to as the trivial AND-ACC for n users.
It is desirable to shorten the code length to squeeze more users into fewer bits since this would require the use and maintenance of fewer orthogonal basis vectors. To do this, one needs to forgo some resiliency. Trappe et al. [5] presented a construction of a K-resilient AND-ACC for n users using balanced incomplete block designs. [7] . However, tables for higher values of (v, k, 1) are not found in [7] . Even if they are available, only theoretical descriptions are given, but not practical construction solutions which are desirable from users' point of view. We shall propose a class of codes developed from GD-PBIBDs (partially balanced incomplete block designs with two associative classes and based on a group-divisible association scheme) with a practical construction solution. Given below is the definition of a GD-PBIBD (See [6] ).
Definition 3:
A group-divisible design with parameters (v = mn, b, r, k, λ 1 , λ 2 ) is an arrangement of v = mn elements into b subsets, each of size k, and each element is repeated r times such that the mn elements are divided into m groups of n elements each, such that a pair of elements within a group occur λ 1 times and between groups occur λ 2 times.
For our purposes, we use a GD-PBIBD with λ 1 = 0, λ 2 = 1. Then, the bit complement of (v, b, r, k, λ 1 , λ 2 ) is an AND-ACC with b = n users for (k − 1) colluders and a code length of v .
New Construction Algorithm
We propose a code generation algorithm that produces a fingerprint code set for n = s 2 
Substep B: Another s matrices of order s × s.
where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ s − 1, k = 0, and T k = circular shift of all the columns of T 0 to the left k times, (k = 1, 2, · · · , s − 1).
Substep C:
Replace the kth (k = 0, 1, 2, · · · , s−1) element of the index matrix M by the matrix ), where l, j = 0, 1, · · · , s 2 − 1 for Step 2.
Step 2. Expansions to s 3 × s 4 matrices.
where 0 ≤ i, j, b ≤ s − 1 and | indicates concatenation. With these s index matrices M b , we can obtain a new index matrix Q of order s × s 2 as
where 
where i, j = 0, 1, · · · , s 2 − 1, and J is the matrix of unities of order s × s 2 . The fingerprint codes generated using the above steps play an important role in a digital fingerprinting system that is robust to an averaging attack. The final incidence matrix of the (s p , s 2p−2 , s p−1 , s, 0, 1)-GD-PBIBD is a set of anticollusion fingerprint codes that can be distributed to s 2p−2 customers, i.e., each column of the matrix is unique fingerprint code for each customer. This code has the "AND-ACC" property that enables the chasing of colluders after an averaging attack, as described in [5] . The code is modulated to noise-like fingerprint patterns, which are embedded into digital contents (See [1] , [2] ). In these works, Kang et al. suggested averaging attack resilient video fingerprinting systems that embed fingerprint codes generated from a GD-PBIBD into a video. Using the "AND-ACC " property of fingerprint codes, colluders who averaged their videos to remove the embedded fingerprint codes can be chased by extracting the averaged fingerprint code.
Substep D: Replace the (i j)th
Example: Suppose we want to construct a (27, 81, 3)-code for 81 individuals, 2 colluders and a code length of 27.
Step 1. 9 × 9 parent matrix.
Substep B. 3 sub matrices T b ,
Substep C. 9 × 9 parent matrix, 
Step 2. 27 × 81 matrix. 
Substep D. 3 3 × 3 4 final matrix N of step 2 when s = 3 and p = 3,
Advantages of this method: In [5] , fingerprint codes have been proposed using BIBD designs with parameters (v, b, r, k, 1). Although, BIBDs are comparable to the proposed GD-PBIBD codes, these GD-PBIBD codes, which are easily constructible using the algorithm described above and are available for s − 1 colluders when s is a prime number, have an advantage over the BIBD codes. For the construction of codes, we consider only s ≥ 3, p ≥ 3. Recent tables of BIBD can be found in [7] . Because theoretical constructions of BIBDs are scattered throughout literature, we have to review the literature and make the desired tables manually. However, here we present a practical construction method of a GD-PBIBD that has the same capability as BIBDs for the purpose of digital fingerprinting.
From a business and economic point of view, digital fingerprint codes have to manage a large number of customers, probably several thousands of individuals. In [7] , BIBD tables can be found that can be converted into fingerprint codes only for a small number of customers. In our construction scheme, we can generate fingerprint codes for more customers than that are presented in [7] for BIBDs. For instance, if we consider a BIBD code (27, 117, 3), the comparable GD-PBIBD code is (27, 81, 3) . Although the BIBD accommodates more individuals, we prefer the GD-PBIBD code for our scheme as it is easy to implement. For s = 3 and p = 5, we obtain a (243, 6561, 3)-code from the GD-PBIBD. In this situation, a BIBD is beyond the range in the tables in [7] or unavailable. For more than 1641 individuals, a BIBD is beyond the range of the table or unavailable, whereas our algorithm provides codes for potential use in such situations.
Conclusion
We proposed a new anticollusion fingerprint code that uses GD-PBIBD design theory and an easy code generation scheme.
The construction algorithm yields a (s p , s 2p−2 , s p−1 , s, 0, 1)-GD-PBIBD, which produces an AND-ACC code: for s − 1 colluders, s 2(p−1) individuals and code length of s p where s is a prime number and p is a positive integer. These codes are preferable to BIBD codes from a business point of view, where the presence of a large number of individuals is desired. It may be interesting to enhance further the construction of these codes for a number of colluders other than s − 1, where s is a prime number.
